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RESPONDING TO ECONOMIC CRISES:





While economic crises are becoming more frequent and severe, our
experience in East Asia has demonstrated how the international response
to these crises remains inadequate. Appropriate policy responses to
economic crises entail three essential dimensions: ¢rst, the maintenance
of full employment and economic stability through macroeconomic
policy; second, complementary structural policy aimed at restoring
con¢dence; and ¢nally, a robust social safety net to mitigate the adverse
and potentially long-term e¡ects of economic downturns. A suitable
crisis response requires that policy-makers recognize the critical role of
¢nancial markets and the existence of time lags. Suitable policy responses
should consider not only an individual economy's ability to absorb
shocks, but also the asymmetries and nonlinearities of alternative
policies. As we thus seek to improve our macroeconomic and structural
policies for the future prevention and mitigation of crises, it is critical
that we bear in mind the protection of the most vulnerable segments of
society from the crises that will inevitably occur.
Economic crises can produce large and rapid increases in inequity.
Indonesia's poverty rate had drifted down from over 60 per cent in 1975 to
7 per cent just prior to the crisis. It is now expected to rise to around 20
per cent by the year 2000. In Korea more than 1 million people have lost
their jobs, and many others face lower real wages and less job security.
Thailand has also seen increasing poverty, unemployment, and falling real
wages. Altogether, prior to the crisis there were 30 million people living
on less than $1 a day in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
By 2000 that number could easily double to 60 million.
The most important policy for socially equitable development is full
employment. The unemployed are not just a statistic or an under-utilized
resource that could have increased GDP. They are people, and no
numbers can convey the degree of disruption that unemployment brings
to their lives, their livelihoods, and the well-being of their families.
Although safety nets and targeted assistance may mitigate some of the
consequences of unemployment, from an economic, political or psycho-
logical perspective, nothing is better than a job. Jobs are the means by
which people participate in the productive economy and feel productive
themselves. It is one of the most important sources of inclusion in the
national economy.
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In the context of developing countries, minimizing underemployment
is just as important as minimizing unemployment. If an Indonesian loses
his or her well-paying factory job, they can always return to their village
and help out on the family farm. The extra output from their e¡ort,
however, may be minimal, making their `job' virtually equivalent to
unemployment.
In the short run, and crisis situations are ¢rst and foremost about
the short run, macroeconomic policy is the most important determinant of
the level of economic activity and thus the level of employment. This will
be the ¢rst subject of my remarks. Second, I will discuss structural policies
which also can be of great importance for social well-being, especially in
the way that they interact with macroeconomic policies. Finally, I will
argue that full employment is only the ¢rst defense; it is often necessary to
employ unemployment insurance, targeted social assistance, and other
social safety net programs that maintain people's incomes and ease their
transition into future jobs.
" Macroeconomic Policy and Maintaining Full Employment
1.1 Macroeconomic Policy Can Do More Harm Than Good
In designing macroeconomic policies, policy-makers face a peculiar con-
straint: although the wrong policies can result in virtually unbounded
harm, the right policies can only keep the economy operating normally. It
is relatively easy to use monetary and ¢scal policy to engineer a 25 per
cent contractionösome argue that this is what the USA did, albeit
inadvertently, in the Great Depression. It is virtually impossible, however,
to use monetary and ¢scal policy to expand the economy by 25 per cent.
This idea is often expressed, particularly in the context of monetary policy,
by analogy to a balloon on a string: Tightening the string can pull the
economy down, but pushing on the string cannot push the economy back
up.
The consequences of policy are asymmetric for several other reasons
as well. First, a relatively small shock to the economy may be self-
correcting, but a larger shock may plunge the economy into a recession.
In economists' technical jargon, we say that nonlinearities are very
important.
Bankruptcy provides an illustration of both the push^pull and
nonlinear phenomena. With a big enough push, you can bring many of the
economy's ¢rms into bankruptcy, but reversing that process is far more
di¤cult. As the economy deteriorates, a large number of ¢rms go
bankrupt, and their mutual obligations raise uncertainty and increase
bankruptcy even more. The result is a large decrease in production,
investment and credit £ows, with the attendant consequences for output
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and unemployment. The huge costs associated with resolving bankruptcies
make it very di¤cult to repair the damage. Also, the organizational capital
that is the ¢rm's core asset dissipates quickly after it is shut down and
rebuilding that organizational capital is a lengthy process. This is re£ected
in the well-known observation that the value of a ¢rm as an ongoing
enterprise is far greater than the value of the assets which constitute it.
A second, and related, reason for lopsided policy results is the
abundant evidence that a period of bad economic performance can be
translated into a prolonged period of higher unemployment and slower
growth. In addition to the reasons just discussed, this can occur because
¢rms respond to bad times by reducing their investment in research and
development. Furthermore, long-term unemployed workers lose their job-
searching skills and become stigmatized by employersöan e¡ect econo-
mists have called hysteresis. Many economists place at least a share of
the blame for high European unemployment in the last 15 years on
hysteresis.
Finally, the social consequences of economic performance are
highly uneven. Even if everyone shares the losses, the e¡ects on the
poor, who have just enough to survive, are enormous compared with
the e¡ects on those who are better o¡. But typically the burden of
adjustment is not shared equally. A disproportionate share of the
increase in unemployment or underemployment is concentrated among
the least well o¡. As a result, these `innocent bystanders', who played
no part in the causes leading up to the crisis, are the ones who bear the
greatest burden.
The asymmetries in burden sharing are not only inequitable, they also
may attenuate the incentives to avoid future crises. Although I am
discussing the response to crises, we must be mindful that the way in which
we respond to crises, or are expected to respond to crises, helps shape the
incentives that make crises more or less likely. If, for instance, crises are
typically precipitated by a build-up of short-term debt, and if short-term
debtors do not share in the losses, or even if they do not bear the full costs
of their actions, then they will be encouraged to continue making risky
loans. Improving the burden sharing is not solely a matter of social
justice.
1.2 Policy Decisions Must Recognize Uncertainty
The asymmetry between the potentially devastating consequences of bad
macroeconomic policy and the simply `normal' consequences of good
macroeconomic policy would not matter if policy-makers could choose the
outcome they most wanted. But they cannot. Macroeconomic policy is
conducted under conditions of great uncertainty. There are, for instance,
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what my Stanford colleague Milton Friedman described as `long and
variable lags' between changes in monetary policy and their e¡ect on the
economy. Fiscal policy is more direct. But because policy a¡ects expect-
ations in di¤cult-to-predict ways, and expectations in turn impact interest
rates and exchange rates, the ¢nal e¡ects of policy remain uncertain. This
is especially true in crisis situations.
As a result, policy-makers must make important decisions in less than
ideal circumstances. If they make the wrong decision, the country can
collapse. If they make the right decision, hardly anyone notices. These
decisions are made in a highly uncertain environment. They must recog-
nize this uncertainty, recognize the asymmetries, and recognize the long-
lasting e¡ects of possible mistakes.
How they should respond to uncertainties depends on the situation
of the economyöincluding its history. One example that illustrates some
of the considerations in decision making under uncertainty comes from
monetary policy decisions in the USA in the mid-1990s. Although the
stakesörelatively small changes in the unemployment rate or in£ationö
and the complexity of the decisions were much smaller than entailed by
macroeconomic decisions in crisis situations, the logic of the argument
may be easier to follow in this context.
In conducting monetary policy, the principal uncertainty the USA
faced concerned the lack of knowledge about the precise level of the
NAIRU, the unemployment rate below which in£ation starts to rise. The
conventional wisdom had been that the NAIRU was 6.0 or 6.2 per cent, but
this rate was inconsistent both with the behavior of in£ation and several
well-documented structural changes in the economy. More important than
the precise level of the NAIRU, however, was the assessment of the risks
entailed by making a mistake on either side, and the costs of reversing such
a mistake. Partly these depended on the initial conditions: in£ation was
already low, while unemployment rates, especially for marginalized
groups, were intolerably high. Risks also depended on the precise slope
and shape of the Phillips curve relating unemployment to changes in
in£ation. Analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers concluded that
the additional in£ation from `too low' an unemployment rate was
relatively small, and that it could be reversed by a period of even lower
unemployment.
The result of our analysis was the assessment that the risk and
consequences of igniting an in£ationary episode were negligible: the views
of the in£ation hawks were simply not justi¢ed by the data. On the other
side, we estimated that the potential bene¢ts to the economy could be quite
large. Beside contributing to faster growth, reductions in unemployment
could help address social problems, including the 20-year-long trend of
increasing exclusion for poor and minority workers, the rising welfare case
load, and the soaring crime rate. The USA did take the risk and allowed
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the unemployment rate to fall, and the bene¢ts have been even better than
we predicted, especially in their contribution to the plunging welfare case
loads and the dramatically falling crime rate. I strongly believe that these
decisions were the right decisions, not just because ex post the outcome
has been consistent with our predictions, but also because they were based
on a good ex ante analysis of the risks.
1.3 Macroeconomic Policy and the Onset of the East Asian Crisis
In an economy facing a crisis, the balance of risks should be a central focus
of discussion. Again, the situation of the economy, including its historical
context, is central. Consider the East Asian countries, with a long history
of stable macroeconomic policies, ¢scal surpluses and low in£ation. For
instance, in the year before the crisis, Korea had brought its in£ation rate
down from 5ÃÙÄ per cent to 4 per cent. The entire region was roughly in
macroeconomic balance at the time the crises struck. As consumption and
investment were likely to plummet, standard macroeconomic models sug-
gested the likelihood of a serious drop in GDP. Given that the countries
were starting from rough macroeconomic balance, this contraction in the
key components of demand would lead to a large increase in unemployment
or underemployment. Given the asymmetries and nonlinearities I discussed
earlier, this situation strongly implied that it would be better to err on the
side of countercyclical policy to o¡set these declines at least partially.
Three other considerations should have played a key role in the study
of the problems facing East Asia and the policy response to them. Many
of these issues were a part of our investigation from the beginning, and I
do not want to engage in after-the-fact analysis; but if we do not fully
understand the response to this crisis, we risk repeating the same mistakes
in responding to future crises.
First let us consider the importance and uncertainty of lags, a point
which I referred to earlier in the context of monetary policy. Lags are
especially large and unpredictable in the domain of exports, say in
responses to changes in exchange rates. These lags featured greatly in our
thinking about macroeconomic policy in the USA, and should have played
an even more important role given the magnitude of the risks, the
nonlinearities and irreversibilities. If one believes that these nonlinearities,
irreversibilities and lags are important, one cannot say that if the economy
goes into a downturn we will reverse course. By then, the damage will be
done. One must balance the risks and recognize the asymmetries. In macro-
economic policy making, one must keep ahead of the game, not running
behind. This requires, among other measures, careful monitoring of data, a
process which is di¤cult in many developing economies where timely data
on the current state of the economy are often relatively scarce. Still, in
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Southeast Asia, for instance, early data on sales of cars and other consumer
durables clearly indicated, almost in real time, the magnitude of the real
economic contraction and raised questions about the wisdom of the region's
macroeconomic stance. And to the degree that data are highly incomplete,
this additional uncertainty needs to be incorporated explicitly into policy
decisions.
Second, theory and empirical evidence over the past two decades have
established the importance of ¢nancial markets, their links with the
macroeconomy, the role that ¢nancial crises play in economic downturns,
and the fact that economic downturns that are precipitated or accom-
panied by banking and currency crises are deeper and longer than, say,
downturns associated with inventory cycles. It was clear that the crises in
East Asia were ¢nancial crises, and this raised a warning £ag about the
risks being faced, and therefore should have a¡ected the policy stance. A
familiarity with the ¢nancial structure in East Asia suggested that the risks
they would face, in this regard, were far more severe than those that had
been encountered in earlier crises.
Third, and most importantly, a risk analysis must take into account
the ability of the economyöits workers and others within societyöto
absorb various shocks, including unemployment and underemployment.
The East Asian countries lacked social safety nets, suggesting that they
faced grave risks: the social costs of an economic downturn might be an
order of magnitude greater than in Finland, where the country experienced
a huge increase in unemployment as a result of its ¢nancial crises but had
in place a strong social welfare system. In countries with social and
political fragilities, risks to the people in the economy can have strong
consequences. Severe economic downturns systematically stir social and
political unrest that in turn worsen the economic downturn, according to
extensive economic and political research, to say nothing of common
sense.
1.4 Political Economy
Given these risks, it is clear how most politicians would behave: they
would push for a policy that minimizes the risk of exacerbating the crisis.
Indeed, given that political risks are also asymmetric, there is even a
concern that they might push too hard.
In many parts of the world, the recognition of this asymmetry of
political response has led to measures that take key parts of macro-
economic policy out of the hands of politicians and put them in the
jurisdiction of an independent central bank. At the international level, too,
those responding to crises are not directly accountable to those a¡ected
by the crises.
Now, people are increasingly concerned that responses are designed
414 The Manchester School
ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 1999.
to re£ect the interests of those who have voices in these independent
institutions, and that those voices are not representative of the groups
a¡ected by the decisions. Of course, independence does not necessarily
entail unrepresentativeness, but empirical studies ¢nd a marked cor-
relation.
We need to recognize that di¡erent policies impose di¡erent risks on
di¡erent groups within the population. Attitudes toward those risks, and
balancing those di¡erential e¡ects, are not just technical matters, but
re£ect value judgments and trade-o¡s which should be an essential part of
the political process. These cannot simply be left to technical experts,
at least not in democratic societies. When technical experts are closely
aligned with the interests of one group, and are disproportionately drawn
from that group, it is not surprising that the policies may exhibit some
disregard toward other groups.
We may talk about the pain of adjustment, we may talk about how
everyone shares the pain, but the record suggests that neither the pain of
adjustment nor the gain associated with the factors precipitating the crisis
were equitably shared. I shall return to this theme later on.
1.5 Economic Strength versus Investor Con¢dence: Is there a Trade-o¡?
It has become an article of faith that countries in crisis must have done
something wrong, and that they can only recover if they punish themselves
with austerity measures. The more severe the crisis, according to this view,
the greater the sins and thus the greater the required penance. This runs
completely contrary to the logic I just outlined that implied that macro-
economic policy should attempt to pre-empt severe economic contractions.
Advocates of painful reforms often justify them by noting that they are
`necessary to restore con¢dence' and that, at least in the short run,
con¢dence is more important than maintaining aggregate output and
employment.
One year ago I questioned this dichotomy in a New York Times op-
ed. I argued that `maintaining a strong economy . . . is essential to
restoring con¢dence'. The unfortunate experience of the year that has
elapsed since I wrote that sentence has strongly con¢rmed this perspective.
High interest rates were supposed to restore con¢dence in East Asia.
Instead they weakened the economies, causing even more depreciated
exchange rates and thus undermining con¢dence still further. Elsewhere in
a Brookings paper, I have analyzed the economics of the relationship
between interest rates and exchange rates in crisis situations. Brie£y, the
logic is that the interest rate is only the promised rate of return on
domestic assets. If a higher interest rate leads to a greater probability of
bankruptcy, then the expected rate of return on domestic assets may go
down, leading to a weaker exchange rate.
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1.6 Designing Macroeconomic Policies for Equitable Recovery
Macroeconomic policy-makers typically focus on questions like the
strength of multiplication e¡ects that increase the impact of policies and
on time lags in policy e¡ectiveness. These are clearly very important issues.
However, little if any consideration is given to equity, or the distributional
impact of the economic policies. I have already argued that changes in
aggregate output tend to be distributed unevenly, and thus inherently have
consequences on the distribution of well-being. But now I want to go
further and draw attention to the di¡erent distributional consequences of
various policies.
The relative e¡ects of monetary policy on di¡erent groups varies from
country to country depending on institutional practices both in the private
sector and in the public sector. In most economies, high interest rates tend
to restrict borrowing and investment by small and medium-sized enter-
prises much more than by large ¢rms. Also, substantial evidence from
several countries has documented that higher interest rates can have a
large adverse e¡ect on farmers' access to credit. This is well documented,
and my other theoretical research over the past decades has helped provide
the explanation for this phenomenon. The distributional e¡ects of changes
in interest rates, however, depend on the degree to which di¡erent credit
markets are segmented and the existence of government programs to help
di¡erent groups gain access to credit. In Brazil, for instance, government
programs and ¢nancial market practices have, to a large degree, delinked
the interest rate faced by many farmers from the key monetary policy
interest rates. In contrast, Indonesia's credit markets are tightly linked,
and an increase in policy interest rates rapidly translates into higher
interest rates across the board.
One implication of this observation is that, from the perspective of
equity, monetary policy-makers need to take into account the existing
institutional arrangements. This is especially true in the short run, while
over the longer run these considerations present a compelling argument
for developing institutional mechanisms to shield vulnerable groups from
the most contractionary aspects of monetary policy.
Fiscal policy a¡ects equity even more directly. A well-designed ¢scal
framework has automatic stabilizers that, at least on the expenditure side,
tend to mitigate some of the inequitable consequences of economic
downturns. The degree to which the poor and vulnerable are protected,
both by automatic and discretionary policies, varies greatly from country
to country. Some argue that many countries need to increase protections
for the disadvantaged by creating more automatic stabilizers, especially
ones that are triggered by severe recessions. I will return to some of the
speci¢c issues in the design of unemployment insurance policies when I
discuss building better safety nets.
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In medicine, we have come a long way from medieval blood lettings
and blaming the victims for their condition. Economic knowledge has made
similar progress. It is essential that we make greater use of these insights,
especially in crisis situations where the consequences of mistakes can be
dramatic and long lived. Let me be clear: I am not against economic policies
that entail painful adjustments. I do not, however, view pain as a virtue in
itself, but as a sometimes necessary accompaniment of the appropriate
policies. And that is exactly the point: if there is to be pain, it should
contribute to strengthening the economy, not exacerbating economic
downturns. And if there is to be pain, the pain must be shared equitably.
á Short-run Structural Solutions and Long-run Structural
Reforms
Many of the same considerations that apply to the macroeconomic policy
responses to crisis situations also apply to the structural policy responses.
Indeed, we are increasingly recognizing that there is no clear separation
between macroeconomic and structural issues. Structural weaknessesö
such as weaknesses in ¢nancial systems or widespread corporate bank-
ruptciesöhave macroeconomic consequences, and mistakes have profound
e¡ects on economic structure that will take years to undo.
2.1 Balancing the Goals of Structural Policies
Unlike macroeconomic policies, structural policies entail a more complex
balancing of di¡erent objectives. Policies need to be designed with four
interrelated considerations in mind: (i) ex ante incentives, (ii) ex post
incentives, (iii) distributional equity and fairness, and (iv) macroeconomic
consequences. To give one illustration, ¢nancial regulation needs to ensure
that borrowers and lenders have the ex ante incentive to behave prudently.
After a crisis, however, the ¢nancial structure of banks and corporations
changes, and policies will imply a di¡erent set of ex post incentives.
Furthermore, ¢nancial regulation can have a large impact on credit £ows,
and thus on the macroeconomy. Finally, the considerations of equityö
including who continues to have access to credit as well as whose money
bails out whomöshould also be important.
Deposit insurance, for instance, was designed explicitly to reduce the
likelihood of runs on banks. The macroeconomic costs of such runs, and
the failure of ¢nancial institutions more broadly, can be enormous. On the
other side, there are risks associated with moral hazard and regulatory
forbearance. Again, policy-makers based their decision on a balancing of
risks: their judgment calls re£ected the interests they served, how they
balanced those risks, and how they took into account those a¡ected in
alternative scenarios.
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The same issues also apply in the design of bankruptcy policies and
corporate restructuring. Policies need to ensure that ex ante incentives
encourage productive innovation but discourage excessive risk taking.
Fairness requires that the rules not be changed midstream. But after a
crisis, the huge debt overhang provides a new set of incentives that changes
¢rms' responses to policies. And, as with the ¢nancial sector, bankruptcies
have a major impact on the macroeconomy.
The balance of these considerations depends on the circumstances.
In good times, the macroeconomic implications of structural policies may
be less important since any contractionary consequences may be easy to
o¡set with more expansionary macroeconomic policies. As the economy
shifts from downturn to recession to depression, the balance of these
objectives shifts. The ex post incentives and the macroeconomic con-
sequences become the overriding objectives.
2.2 Financial Responses to Crises: Preserving the Flow of Credit
The ¢nancial system is like the brain of the economy. In a crisis it can
virtually cease to function. The priority of ¢nancial policies is to keep credit
£owing and to avoid the wholesale destruction of informational capital that
occurs when ¢nancial institutions close down. This crisis-time shift in
objective has important implications for many policies. In normal times we
view high capital adequacy standards as a way to ensure prudent banking.
The point of the additional capital, however, is to provide a cushion against
bad times. If, in the midst of a downturn, we push banks too quickly toward
`prudent' capital adequacy ratios, we risk shutting down the £ow of credit
entirely. The same applies to regulatory forbearance more broadly in that we
have to be more hesitant than we might normally like about shutting down
problematic ¢nancial institutions.
The direct concern for equity in responding to a ¢nancial crisis may also
be outweighed by the desire to avoid a large downturn, which itself would
have huge adverse consequences on the well-being of the most vulnerable.
Bailing out some of the better o¡ at the expense of the taxpayers as a whole
may be distasteful but unavoidable. In the USA, many of us who were
concerned about equity more broadly still supported the government bailout
of the Savings and Loans. However, the overall equity consequences can be
in£uenced by other policies, especially if they diminish the perception that
policy-makers are cutting out bene¢ts for the poor in order to mitigate the
¢nancial problems of the rich, a theme I return to below.
2.3 Maintaining Production Amidst Systemic Bankruptcies
The procedures for handling bankruptcies in normal times and in
crises should be quite di¡erent. Just as a central concern in the time of
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crisis in addressing the problems of the ¢nancial sector should be the
preservation of the £ow of credit, so too the central concern in corporation
organization should be maintaining production. But doing so in the midst
of systemic bankruptcies is no small challenge.
In normal times, bankruptcy conveys a lot of information about the
quality of a ¢rm's management. In the context of a system-wide failure,
little information about either the manager or even the ¢rm's long-run
viability is conveyed. Even a well-managed ¢rm could easily go bankrupt
simply because it failed to plan for an 80 per cent devaluation and a period
of interest rates in excess of 40 per cent.
Not only is it undesirable to handle bankruptcy in the midst of a crisis
in the standard way, it is probably not even feasible. There simply are not the
resourcesöhuman or monetaryöto address each bankruptcy individually.
How can an administration possibly employ standard bankruptcy
procedures when two-thirds of the ¢rm in a country are bankrupt, which, by
one estimate, is the case today in Indonesia? Furthermore, the systemic
nature of the bankruptcies makes sorting out the net asset positions even
more di¤cult than normal. Because the bankrupt ¢rms' assets consist of
claims on other ¢rms that are also bankrupt, discovering their net worth
entails solving a complicated set of simultaneous equations. A further
di¤culty in following normal bankruptcy procedures is that it would be very
di¤cult to ¢nd new managers or trustees to oversee all of the restructured
¢rms; this limits the feasibility ofmanagement changes.
Under these circumstances, the priority of corporate restructuring is
to ensure that production continues with as little disruption as possible.
This will often entail restoring e¡ective governance to those who know
how to manage the enterprisesöthe current owner-managersöwhile at
the same time reducing their cash £ow burdens. Accomplishing this may
require a combination of carrots and sticks to increase the speed of the
workout. An example of a measure that would probably be included is
granting owners a greater equity share than they might be entitled to under
absolute priority.
This raises the concerns of equity, speci¢cally the fairness of changing
the rules in midstream. To some degree, these claims may be outweighed by
the greater imperative of maintaining production in the crisis. But `the rules'
themselves are inherently ambiguous in the midst of a situation that neither
party to the contract explicitly agreed upon or even envisioned. How the
contract would change had it explicitly included the contingency of, say, an
80 per cent devaluation and 15 per centGDP contraction is uncertain.
2.4 TheComplementarity ofMacroeconomicPolicyandStructuralResponses
When macroeconomic policy is conducted in a way that maintains the
health of the economy, corporations will be able to continue producing
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and banks will ¢nd themselves with fewer bad loans on their books.
As a result, the processes of corporate bankruptcy workouts and
¢nancial recapitalization will be that much easier. In contrast, overly
contractionary macroeconomic policies make the necessary structural
reforms much more di¤cult.
The relationship between what economists call `macroeconomic' and
`microeconomic' policies goes the other way as well. A series of ill-
conceived and overly hasty bank closures can undermine the soundness of
the ¢nancial system, weakening the aggregate economy and possibly
making it less responsive to a monetary stimulus.
2.5 Long-run Structural Reforms in the Midst of a Crisis
My discussion of structural reforms in the midst of a crisis has emphasized
that, just as macroeconomic policies need to be sensitive to the circum-
stances of the country, so too do microeconomic policies. In policy design,
the balance of concerns changes dramatically as one enters a recession,
and even more so as a recession turns into a depression. Just as it is wrong
to design an economic policy for East Asia that ¢tted the circumstances
of Latin America in the 1980s, it is also inappropriate to design a policy
for a depression that does not fully re£ect the unique characteristics of an
economy in the midst of an economic collapse.
Structural policy has an important long-run dimension, one that is
perhaps more central to the thinking of policy-makers than the long-run
consequences of macroeconomic policy. Many reforms, like improving
auditing and accounting standards, increasing capital adequacy require-
ments or freeing international trade, are aimed at increasing long-run
e¤ciency and stability. They are not necessarily related to responding to
the immediate problem of failed banks and bankrupt corporations.
In recent years, wide-ranging, long-term structural reforms have been
at the heart of many of the crisis programs. There are two possible
justi¢cations. The ¢rst is that crises may present a unique opportunity to
undertake reforms whose desirability has long been recognized but for
which there is little political will in non-crisis periods. The second
justi¢cation is that, to the degree that there is a perception that these
structural weaknesses caused the crisis, then even reforms with only long-
run economic bene¢ts might immediately improve con¢dence and thus
help to restore economic strength.
Not all long-term structural reforms, however, make sense in the
midst of a crisis. In particular, there are three reasons why we should be
cautious. The ¢rst is simply that responding to a crisis is extremely di¤cult
and often requires the full attention of the scarce personnel of both
the crisis country and the international institutions working with it.
`Overloading' the reform program may distract scarce attention away
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from the immediate problems. Second, some reforms that are bene¢cial
in the long run may actually harm the economy in the short run.
Eliminating distortions that create `rents', i.e. returns above the normal
level, although bene¢cial in the long run, may exacerbate the problem of
bankruptcy. Similarly, improving transparency in the midst of a crisis,
under some circumstances, may reveal that the problems are much worse
than anyone had realized, thus exacerbating the crisis. Third and ¢nally,
to the degree that unnecessary structural reforms are pushed into the
programs by outsiders, domestic political support for the entire program
may be undermined, including the parts that are essential for addressing
the crisis at hand. As an aside, there was an especial reluctance in the USA
to move to more transparent, more e¤cient bank accounting standards
and risk adjustments in the midst of our banking crises in the 1980s.
The arguments for and against structural reforms that go beyond
those directly related to resolving the crisis help us to understand when
they are and are not justi¢ed. Perhaps the most important test is that they
are genuinely desired by the crisis country, and not imposed from the
outside. The second requirement is that there has long been agreement on
the need to make this structural improvement. The third is that it should
be related, at least in terms of perception, to the actual crisis. And the
fourth is that the reform will not have directly contractionary e¡ects in the
short run.
â Building Better Social Safety Nets
Even with the best e¡orts toward sound macroeconomic and structural
policies, a country is unlikely to escape a serious balance of payments or
banking crisis without a period of slower growth or even economic
contraction. Experience also shows that income inequality tends to rise in
periods of economic crises, structural adjustment and output contractions.
Both the lower overall incomes and the shift in their distribution increase
the number of people living in poverty.
3.1 Averting Persistent Social Problems
Even transitory economic contractions can have long-lived e¡ects on
people's well-being, and thus on economic performance. Increasing mal-
nutrition at crucial stages of childhood, a well-documented consequence of
economic contractions, can have adverse e¡ects on the physical and mental
development of children. This is true even if the crisis passes and their
nutritional intake improves. Reports from Indonesia and Thailand indicate
that millions of children are not returning for the 1998 school year, as their
parents are unable to a¡ord the school fees, other educational costs, or
even spare their children's time. If this lasts very much longer, an entire
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generation of Southeast Asians will ¢nd that its educational development
was compromised by the crisis.
Just as the poor and disadvantaged bear a disproportionate burden
of the adjustment, so too do girls and women su¡er much more than boys
and men. In East Asia, women shared in the bene¢ts of three decades of
development. But when the crisis struck, they found themselves to be the
¢rst to lose their jobs. A large fraction of the school dropouts have been
girls. In addition, reports indicate that prostitution, including child
prostitution, is rising throughout East Asia.
It is certainly true on average that crises lead to worsening social
well-being, especially for the poor and vulnerable. In part this is due to the
direct e¡ects of the crisis, but in part it is because in the past policy-makers
have focused on macroeconomic adjustment, and ignored or even actively
cut spending on social programs in an e¡ort to reduce the overall de¢cit.
In Thailand, for instance, the ¢scal year 1998 expenditure cuts have largely
left the overall health budget una¡ected. But health spending for the poor
has been reduced greatly: the main programs for the poor and near-poor,
the health card schemes, which bene¢t 35 million people, have been cut by
more than 50 per cent in nominal terms.
Countries do not need to cut spending for the poor during crises.
Chile responded to its 1982 crisis with large-scale increases in targeted
social spending. As a result, despite a GDP contraction almost as large as
Indonesia's 1998 contraction, Chile enjoyed a dramatic acceleration in
the decline of infant mortality.
3.2 Social Spending Can Support Macroeconomic and Structural Policies
Spending money on social programs can also be complementary to the
macroeconomic and structural policies discussed above. In the crudest
terms, expanded social spending can be a very e¡ective way to engineer a
¢scal expansion. If a ¢scal expansion is spent on, for instance, physical
infrastructure, then much of the money will be spent buying imports of
capital equipment, blunting its expansionary consequences. Spending on
social programs keeps almost all of the money in the country, potentially
leading to a larger output `multiplier'. In expanding social programs,
however, it is important to be mindful of the attendant administrative
di¤culties, and the consequent potential for wasteful expenditures or even
corruption.
Perhaps more importantly, incorporating social spending as an
integral part of a reform package can increase the political and social
consensus for the overall reforms. History shows that the most successful
stabilization programs have been ones that were grounded in a broad-
based social consensus, a point that my predecessor as chief economist of
the World Bank, Michael Bruno, helped to demonstrate both as a
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researcher and as a policy-maker. The perception that a reform program
is not just a bailout but a strengthened safety net for the poor and the
middle class is essential for building the democratic support and social
stability necessary for a successful overall program.
3.3 Social Policy Priorities for East Asia
In the context of East Asia, building a more robust social safety net is both
more challenging and potentially more important than in other countries.
For the last decades, East Asia had counted on rapid growth and lifetime
employment to provide social security for its citizens. At best, they have
limited unemployment insurance and only very modest social safety nets.
In this context the current priorities are to protect and strengthen the
current institutions and develop new measures to deal with the immediate
crisis. This is especially important in four areas:
(1) Ensuring food security. Food is the basic necessity of life. Without
food, children will become malnourished, with permanent con-
sequences for later life. In the midst of a crisis there are both supply
and demand problems. There may be an inadequate overall supply of
food, and the food distribution system may break down. Most
famines, however, are not due to a lack of availability of food, but to
lack of resources in poor families to acquire the food. Given limited
resources, ideally one would like to target food programs to the most
needy. Even at the best of times, designing targeted programs is
di¤cult. Administrative costs can be high, and the costs of errorsönot
getting the bene¢ts to those who otherwise face malnutritionöcan be
enormous. But developing such programs in the midst of a crisis can
be especially problematic. Just as the design of macroeconomic and
structural reform programs needs to be sensitive to the nature of the
crisis the country is facing and the depth of the economic downturn, so
too must the design of the social safety net. In a crisis, the most fruitful
focus may be on maintaining low prices for essential staple foods, like
rice, while ensuring that distribution networks remain e¡ective.
(2) Maintaining the purchasing power of vulnerable households. The
importance of maintaining the purchasing power of vulnerable
households cannot be overemphasized. As I noted above, lack of
purchasing power, not lack of supply, has been the root cause of
most famines and most malnourishment. Lack of purchasing power
is leading to school dropouts and the deterioration of health. One
method of achieving this objective is through the promotion of
public works. In this case, e¡ort needs to be made to ensure that
they are well targeted, including balancing the needs of urban and
rural dwellers, and those of women and men. A second method is to
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develop or expand the unemployment insurance system. This makes
the most sense in Korea: it already has an unemployment insurance
system that, despite large recent expansions, continues to leave the
majority of workers without coverage. It is important to recognize
that the main drawback of unemployment insurance programs, their
e¡ects on the incentives to look for work and thus on e¤ciency,
may be much smaller in severe recessions where the marginal
adverse incentive e¡ect is minimal and, if jobs are rationed, may
even disappear in the overall economy.
(3) Maintaining economic and social services for the poor, including
spending on education and healthcare. One example is Indonesia's
`back-to-school' campaign which involves a ¢ve-year national program
to provide scholarships for poor children along with a mass media
and social mobilization e¡ort to keep them attending school.
(4) Increasing monitoring, diagnosis and public information to ensure that
we design and target social programs well.
In addition to these short-run measures, the East Asian countries have
begun the process of thinking about the design of social security systems
for the longer run. These reforms can be done in a way that complements
other structural reforms. For instance, e¡orts to liberalize labor markets
in Korea, and diminish lifetime employment protection, will only work
well if they are complemented by an extension of the unemployment
insurance system.
3.4 The World Bank's Role in Containing the Social Consequences of the
Crisis
Prior to the crisis, the World Bank was working with a number of East
Asian countries to help them continue their social progress. In the last
year we have stepped up our e¡orts, in terms of policy advice, technical
assistance and funding, to contain the social consequences of the crisis. At
the same time, we are continuing to provide advice and support for longer
term social safety reforms.
In terms of ¢nancing, some World Bank programs in East Asia
include a $300 million loan for a social investment project in Thailand that
covers a wide range of the policy priorities discussed above; a $275 million
loan for poverty reduction in rural areas of Indonesia and substantial
funding for anti-poverty programs in other areas; funding for labor markets
and social safety nets in Korea; loans to increase job opportunities and
access to basic social services in the Philippines; and a $300 million
Economic and Social Sector Loan to provide support for Malaysia's public
expenditures on the poor.
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ã Concluding Remarks
Although the experience of East Asia is the direct motivation for many
of my remarks, the lessons are unfortunately much more general. In the
last decades, crises have become too frequent and too severe. Since 1975,
there have been banking and currency crises in nearly 100 countriesöwith
the frequency of these crises increasing over time. Prior to East Asia, we
had witnessed ten cases when a banking and currency crisis struck
simultaneously. The result was contractions of between 5 and 12 per cent
of GDP in the year of the crisis and negative or very slow growth for
several years after.
In the midst of economic crises, newspaper headlines are dominated
by the falls in exchange rates and stock indices. Behind the headlines, how-
ever, are large increases in unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, child
labor, and prostitution. The political, economic, psychological, and even
physiological e¡ects of these problems can persist long after the stock
markets and exchange rates have recovered. Indonesia is in the midst of a
full-scale depressionöno euphemism, such as economic downturn, or even
recession, can do justice to the situation. The situation in other countries
has not reached the same extreme, but it is still too soon to know for sure
the depths to which these economies will plummet, and at the very least
they confront a severe recession.
The situation is intolerable. We have an international economic archi-
tecture which has led to more frequent crises, and yet our means of
responding have proven inadequate. While there is much talk about pain,
the poor have absorbed more than their share of the pain without sharing
commensurately in the promised gain.
Let us be frank with ourselves and each other: we will not be able to
prevent all crises. That is why I have devoted my remarks to responding
to crises, with a special emphasis on socially equitable recovery and
development. Improving the burden sharing in crisis situations has the
potential to create more incentives for investors to avoid crises. At the
same time, it can help maintain the social stability and political consensus
that are, among other things, necessary to rebuild investor con¢dence
and restore economic health.
We do need a new economic architecture to reduce the likelihood and
severity of crises, to make it less likely that even countries that have pursued
good economic policies will be battered, as they have been in recent weeks,
forcing them to adopt policies which will inevitably lead to increased
unemployment and more human su¡ering. But we need even more e¡ective
and more humane ways of responding to crises, ways that at least accord
morewith fundamental notions of human decency and social justice.
I have emphasized that the most e¡ective ways of responding to crises,
which most protect the interests of the poor, are ways that maintain the
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strength of the economy. There are certain elementary lessons that I have
stressed: there are asymmetriesöit is easier to put an economy into a deep
recession than to pull it out; there are large nonlinearitiesölarge shocks
have disproportionately larger and more irreversible e¡ects; mistakes today
have persistent consequences; lags are important; and ¢nance is central,
with ¢nancial crises being deeper and longer lived than economic downturns
arising from other sources. Economies di¡er in their institutions, in their
abilities to bear shocks, and in the extent of their social safety net. Part of
maintaining the economy's strength entails undertaking structural reforms
that are essential to keep the economy moving, like corporate restructuring
and recapitalization of the banking system that maintain production and
the £ow of capital. Other longer term structural reforms may be justi¢ed if
they are well motivated, will result in enhanced con¢dence, and do not
directly undermine the economy in the short run.
Three general observations underlie my analysis of the design of
responses. First, and most importantly, there are great uncertainties. The
response to crises must take all of the factors I described above into
account; it must balance the risks.
This brings me to the second point: di¡erent responses can have
markedly di¡erent e¡ects on di¡erent groups, and confront them with
di¡erent levels and kinds of risks. The analysis of these di¡erential e¡ects
should be of ¢rst order importance in designing crisis responses that are
socially just.
In short, designing responses is not just a technical matter, to be left
to technical experts. The balancing of risks and trade-o¡s is intrinsically a
political decision, and needs to be made by those who are politically
accountable. Countries should not be given a single option of the `correct'
course. That approach is wrong and misguided.
Finally, we must recognize our limitations: not only will we have only
limited success in preventing crises, our responses may have only limited
ability to stop the crises from developing into a recession. Knowing this,
we must work hard to develop better safety nets to mitigate these adverse
consequences.
I do not want to enter now into the debate about whether the policies
which were put into place in the aftermath of the East Asia crisis
exacerbated the downturn. The counterfactuals are always di¤cult: what
would have happened if . . . . While not all the jury may have turned in
their ballots, there is a growing consensus on the matter.
Today, as macroeconomic stances have eased, and the public debate
has moved on to the issues of international architecture and shifted away
from the design of responses, it should be clear that controversies remain,
disputes in which the same sets of considerations, the same uncertainties
and risks, play out. How fast should banks be made to comply with capital
adequacy standards? How strong a set of carrots and sticks need to be
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put into place to induce corporate reorganization? What role should the
public sector play? What role do supply and demand factors play in
addressing problems of food security?
Humans are fallible, and so why should we expect more of human
institutions? The fact that mistakes have been made, or mistakes will be
made, should not be our overarching concern. There are, however, two
things that do disturb me. First, I do not believe that all of the
knowledge at our disposal, knowledge about lags and irreversibilities,
about persistence and asymmetries, about the relationships between
¢nancial markets and economic activity, nor even the speci¢c-country
knowledgeöknowledge of the di¡erence between the East Asian
economies and those of Latin Americaöwas e¡ectively brought to bear
in the design of the responses. Our knowledge will always be imperfect,
but we should strive to use what limited knowledge we have available.
Second, I do not believe that the interests of the most vulnerable, the
workers and small businessmen, the farmers and the day laborers, the
children whose education will be interrupted and whose future will be
destroyed through malnourishmentöall of those whose well-being is so
adversely a¡ected, were taken into account as fully as were the perceptions
of the investment community. I am not sure their voice was heard, that
either they had a seat at the table or their interests were well represented.
And all of this was in the name of avoiding devaluations and preventing
standstills, actions which inevitably occurred.
I do believe that we can design more e¡ective responses to crises,
responses that are more socially just. But I believe that if we are to achieve
this, we must have more democratic accountability, more representative-
ness, in the way that the response packages are designed. We must go
beyond paying lip-service to these values. In American parlance, we must
give voice to Main Street and to those whose toil and work provide both
our necessities and our luxuries. Are we to add to the growing divide
between the haves and have nots a new inequalityöan inequality in
burden sharing in the increasingly frequent and deep crises? Unless we
construct a new democratic international architecture that ensures that
these silent voices are heard, I fear that what we have seen in East Asia is
the inevitable precursor of the future.
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